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CYBERDAMAGES
By Stephen T. Black1
Theft of personal property is easy to consider, but theft of information
poses unique problems. Courts and legislatures dealing with victims
of data breaches grapple with whether the victim has been harmed – in
a manner that the law can redress. In most cases, the thief is gone, and
the victims – the individual whose data was taken and the company it
was entrusted to – are engaged in a lawsuit. This article engages in a
discussion on the nature of such “cyberdamage,” and whether a mere
showing of damage to privacy is enough, or if a showing of financial
harm is required.
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INTRODUCTION
When an individual steals from you, the damage you suffer comes
in many forms, including the loss of property, a feeling of violation and
invasion of privacy, and a resultant perception of being vulnerable.
While the legal system measures the economic loss from theft, it does
not measure well (if at all) the damage due to nonfinancial factors. For
example, replacement value, increased insurance risk and costs paid for
additional security may be recovered.
Theft of personal data is a growing frontier, both for criminals and
companies seeking to protect data. When an individual takes personal
data,2 either from you or from a third party you have entrusted it to,
does the legal system interpret that as theft? Part of the difficulty
plaintiffs have faced is defining the nature of the harm they suffer when
a company does not protect their information. Is this an invasion of
privacy? A tort of negligence? A breach of trust? A crime?
In examining these questions, this article will start with the law of
theft, particularly as it applies to information theft, and then proceed to
look at the law of torts. We will then discuss the nature of personal
information, what the law perceives as damages from the
misappropriation of that information, and how the courts are dealing
2

Laws in the United States usually refer to this data as “personally identifiable information” (PII),
while other nations may reference “personal data”, “personal information” or “important data.”
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with the ever-growing number of class action suits due to data
breaches.
I.

THE LAW OF THEFT
A. What is “Theft?”

The colloquial term “theft” refers to crimes involving the taking
of a person's property without their permission. But theft in the legal
sense may encompass more than one category of crime, and sometimes
more than one level of seriousness. In both usages, we can start with
the definition of theft as the unauthorized taking of property from
another with the intent to permanently deprive them of it.
Within the taking element, we can talk about the mechanics of
seizing possession of property, including removing or attempting to
remove the property from another’s possession. However, it is
frequently the element of intent where most of the complex and
interesting legal questions typically arise.3
Example 1. Tara walks by a bicycle on the street. She takes the
bicycle with the intent of keeping it.
Example 2. Tara is working on a computer at the library and sees
a flash drive that is not hers at the workstation. She picks it up, puts it
in her pocket, and walks out the door with the intent of keeping it.
What has Tara stolen? The bicycle is an easy case, as is the actual,
physical flash drive. But what if Larry is a photographer, and the flash
drive contains Larry’s latest photos?
“At early common law, the subject of larceny was limited to
tangible personal property, such as cash, jewelry, furniture, and
other merchandise. The requirement of asportation excluded
from the protection of theft law things at two ends of the
property continuum: at one end, real property; at the other,
intangible property such as choses-in-action, stocks, and
bonds.”4
B. Theft of Intangibles
Historically, the law would not have considered Larry the victim
of theft of his photos because it was not tangible. But looking at the
situation today, we would consider the loss of the flash drive to be de

3
Theft Overview, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/theft-overview.html
(last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
4
Stuart P. Green, Introduction: Symposium on Thirteen Ways to Steal A Bicycle, 47 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 795, 796 (2013).

136

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

minimis, and the loss of the photos – perhaps the only copy of Larry’s
effort – to be the greater injury.5
“By the mid-twentieth century, … theft reform became a
primary goal of the American Law Institute, in drafting its
Model Penal Code, first promulgated in 1962, while in England,
theft reform became an early goal of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee, the precursor to the Law Commission of England
and Wales, which drafted what would become the Theft Act of
1968. Both efforts led to criminal codes that eliminated
supposedly archaic distinctions such as those between larceny,
embezzlement, and false pretenses, and replaced them with a
more-or-less consolidated offense of ‘theft.’”6
Does it matter whether Larry has a backup of the photos?7 Does
it matter that Larry has been deprived of the only copy, or is it that
someone has, without Larry’s permission, accessed his property
without permission? We can readily see that a theft has occurred, not
only of the flash drive, but also of the information which was contained
on it. So, what happens if the information is taken without the theft of
the thumb drive? “[I]s remote cyber bank theft more blameworthy than
conventional bank theft? If cyber theft really is harder to detect or
apprehend, would that fact by itself make the offender more
culpable?”8
Consider Larry's photographic images being taken and used
without payment for commercial purposes. Few would doubt that
something has been taken, but the value he is owed as compensation is
hard to determine. Can Larry’s photos be recreated? Were they of an
event that will never happen again? Are these commercial photos, or
“just” personal photos of Larry and friends? If there is no other record
of what was on the flash drive, is Larry limited in seeking only the
replacement value of the physical drive, as opposed to the value of the
intangible photos?
“I believe,” [Prof. Brenner] says, that “my identity--my namedoes have . . . value and should qualify for protection under the law of
theft.”9 As support, she cites a passage from Shakespeare's Othello:
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing; ‘Twas
mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands. // But he that filches
5
See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of
Intangible Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683 (2000).
6
Green, supra note 4, at 797.
7
See Thomas G. Field, Crimes Involving Intangible Property, 11 U. N.H. L. REV. 171 (2013).
8
Green, supra note 4, at 803.
9
Id. at 804.
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from me my good name // Robs me of that which not enriches him //
And makes me poor indeed.”10
C. Cyber Theft
Asportation, or "taking" is a salient element in traditional theft.
However, cyber theft does not always involve a "taking" at all. This
aspect often is far less meaningful to the victim of cyber theft than the
interference with his or her property rights. As a result, meaningful
remuneration sometimes escapes the victim if this element is not
properly fulfilled.
The asportation element in cyber theft is well defined as carrying
away a copy of someone else's data. The victim usually still has a copy
of the data but is no longer has sole possession or access. What has
been taken is the owner’s sole possession or, in other words, her right
of private access. 11
Stealing the sole access or possession poses challenges for
traditional notions of the definition of property, in the theft context.
Theft remuneration and even gradation of the offense is based upon
value of property stolen. The property stolen may be intangible, and
the value may hinge on the possibility of dissemination of the data that
devalues it commercially (in the case of Larry's professional photos) or
invades the privacy of the owner (in the case of personal data). Each
case is highly fact specific. The problem with “theft,” in the
digital/intangible/informational sense, is that we must struggle with the
sense of the crime. Is it that the owner of property has been deprived
of its use? Is it that the victim’s ownership, or possession, or maybe
even privacy and peace has been disturbed? Is it that access has been
taken where it would not have been given?
Theft and cyber theft are distinguished on the basis that theft is a
zero-sum offense, in which sole possession of the property, such
as funds, information, or software, is transferred from the rightful
owner to the thief, while cybertheft is a non-zero-sum offense.
The non-zero-sum offense consists of interfering with, rather
than carrying away, the rightful owner's property with the
intention to permanently, and wholly, deprive him or her of its
possession and use. The dynamic usually involved in non-zerosum theft consists of the cyber-thief's copying data that belongs
to someone else and “carrying [the copy] away.” This scenario
10
Id. at 805 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3,
http://shakespeare.mit.edu/othello/othello.3.3.html).
11
Susan W. Brenner, Bits, Bytes, and Bicycles: Theft and "Cyber Theft", 47 NEW ENG. L. REV.
817, 821 (2016).

138

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

does not involve a zero-sum offense because the victim retains
possession of his or her property albeit in diminished capacity
because the victim is no longer the sole possessor of the
information. Unfortunately, while the dichotomy between theft
(zero-sum transaction) and cybertheft (non-zero-sum
transaction) can be absolute, it can also be more nuanced. The
ambiguities that can creep in to the varieties of cyber theft are a
function of the conceptual deficit that exists in this area.12
In order to align cybertheft with the notion of traditional theft, we
would have to pigeonhole what the “thief” has stolen into the notion of
property. While we can do that (with some mental and legal
gymnastics!13), it is not always pretty, nor is it always consistent.
But for us, the question is not limited to the notion of theft,
because we are really looking at the question of damage. This is a much
broader concept, because not only does it include damage from theft,
but it also includes damage from tort.
These questions form an interesting background for breach
litigation, but not a complete one. Most of the litigation does not
involve the hacker/thief, who may not ever be found and who may not
be operating in the same jurisdiction. What happens when the theft
happens to a trusted third party? To answer this question, we need to
discuss the law of torts.

II.

THE LAW OF TORTS
A. Cyber Remedies in Tort.

Tort violations may result from intentional actions, a breach of
duty as in negligence, or due to a violation of statutes.14 Tort liability
depends on the existence of a legal duty – for “where there is no duty
there is no liability.”15
In cases of cyber breaches, there are two common types of
defendants: 1) a hacker or thief who intentionally caused harm, and 2)
a third-party holding data that negligently breached a duty to safeguard
personal information. The hacker-thief and his assets are unlikely to
be served and attached. He may be in another country, known merely
by an online moniker or even an IP address, making costs of bringing
him to court impractical. As a result, many cases seek damages solely
12

Id.
See infra, Part V.B.
14
See Tort Law Liability, LEGALMATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/tortlaw-liability.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
15
Bucheleres v. Chicago Park Dist., 171 Ill. 2d 435, 447 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
13
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from the trusted third-party data holder, who is likely to be solvent and
easy to serve.
The statutory right to privacy (in tort) may be breached by third
party data holders when they negligently fail to safeguard personal
data. However, many financial institutions are setting a higher standard
than that of the statutory right to privacy. For example, the policy of
one major banking institution, which is not atypical, states in reassuring
terms:
The law gives you certain privacy rights. Bank of America
gives you more.
....
Keeping financial information secure is one of our most
important responsibilities. We maintain physical, electronic and
procedural safeguards to protect Customer Information.
....
. . . All companies that act on our behalf are contractually
obligated to keep the information we provide to them
confidential . . . .16
A customer reading this information would conclude, at a
minimum, that in exchange for entrusting the bank with personal
information, the bank agreed (1) to protect the data by means of
physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards and (2) to keep it
confidential. “Other language in the privacy policy reinforces those
sensible conclusions by stressing the importance of precautions on the
part of the customer to guard against disclosure or unauthorized use of
account and personal information.”17
B. Bailment as a Cause of Action for Cyber Violations
While bailment may seem an antiquated term when referring to
intangible assets, the concept proves relevant when a trusted third-party
fails to safeguard personal information. “A bailment relationship is
said to arise where an owner, while retaining title, delivers personalty
to another for some particular purpose upon an express or implied
contract. The relationship includes a return of the goods to the owner
or a subsequent disposition in accordance with his instructions.” 18
Historically, the property may be tangible or intangible.19

16
Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L.
REV. 255, n. 152 (2005).
17
Id. at 279.
18
Lionberger v. United States, 371 F.2d 831, 840 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
19
See, e.g., Liddle v. Salem Sch. Dist. No. 600, 249 Ill. App. 3d 768 (1993) (information in a
letter was property that could be the subject of a bailment).
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That property can include money,20 choses in action,21 negotiable
notes, bonds, corporate stock, insurance policies, and checks.22 It can
also include client lists,23 digital music files,24 and data and software.25
The requirement that the property be returned has been
overemphasized, as a disposition or destruction will suffice.
A ‘bailment’ in its ordinary legal sense imports the delivery of
personal property by the bailor to the bailee who keeps the
property in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract, express
or implied, that the trust shall be faithfully executed, and the
property returned or duly accounted for when the special
purpose is accomplished or that the property shall be kept until
the bailor reclaims it.26
Breach of the trust created by a bailment results in liability of the
bailee for conversion. “Any unauthorized delivery of bailed property
by a bailee—even delivery to the wrong person resulting from the
bailee's good faith mistake—constitutes a conversion.”27 Further,
“bailees are ‘not only liable for losses occasioned by their negligence,
but for those which arise from innocent mistakes in the delivery of
goods to persons not entitled to receive them.”28
However, not every court agrees that personal identifying
information is property.29 To be fair, there is a good argument that
some information is not property, because it is not sensitive or private
or unique enough.30 There are a few reasons why, at least in the context
20

In re LGI Energy Solutions, Inc., 460 B.R. 720, 728 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011).
Van Wagoner v. Buckley, 148 A.D. 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
22
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir.
2004).
23
See, e.g., Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 9 Misc. 3d 589 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
24
Marchello v. Perfect Little Prods., Inc., 94 A.D.3d 825 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
25
David Barr Realtors, Inc. v. Sadei, No. 03-97-00138-CV, 1998 WL 333954 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998).
26
Weinberg v. Wayco Petroleum Co., 402 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Mo. App. 1966).
27
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Wagner Fur, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1101, 1105 (S.D.N.Y.1991)
(emphasis in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 234 and § 234 cmt. a.).
28
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 1100, 1106 (10th Cir.
2004) (internal citations omitted).
29
Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 679 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Enslin v.
Coca-Cola Co., 739 Fed. Appx. 91 (3d Cir. 2018); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (social security numbers and credit card information stolen from a computer
were not property for purposes of the law of bailment); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer
Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974-75 (“the Court is hard pressed to conceive of
how Plaintiffs' Personal Information could be construed to be personal property so that Plaintiffs
somehow ‘delivered’ this property to Sony and then expected it be returned.”) In re Target Corp.
Customer Data Sec. Breach of Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1177.
30
Ree v. Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom.
Zappos.com, Inc. v. Stevens, 139 S.Ct. 1373 (2019) (Congress recognized that credit card
21
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of breach litigation, that this argument is flawed. First, the fact that
some hacker found value in the information speaks to the fact that
information can be treated as property. Recognizing the fact that the
hacker will package the information and then sell it to others leaves us
begging the question … did the hacker have property? Was it stolen?
Second, the whole concept of identity theft recognizes, at least on
some level, that a person’s identity can be a protectable, legallycognizable right.31 And finally, entire industries exist because “data is
power.”32 Google, Facebook and numerous others have built empires
based on this market reality. Furthermore, when one company
exchanges information for consideration with another company, what
do you call the information but property?
This mental exercise just leads us back to the original question:
Has the victim, who entrusted her PII to a store, suffered harm when
that information is taken? Is the store liable? Is this a matter of trust
(both in the colloquial sense as well as the legal sense)?
C.

Conversion

Once a bailee has received property from another, they have a
duty to return or account for the property. But what standard do we
apply to ascertain a breach of that duty? Ordinary negligence? Gross
negligence? Is the bailee a fiduciary?33
If we find conversion, what is the measure of damages? We can’t
reseal Pandora’s Box, or restore privacy, although courts and
legislatures would love to try.34
III.

OTHER BASES FOR LIABILITY
A. Fair Credit Reporting Act

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, enacted
to promote the “confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
utilization”35 of consumer information reported by consumer reporting
information was sensitive).
31
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
32
Frederike Kaltheuner & Elettra Bietti, Data is Power: Towards Additional Guidance on
Profiling and Automated Decision-Making in the GDPR, 2 J. INFO. RIGHTS POL’Y & PRAC.
(2017), https://journals.winchesteruniversitypress.org/index.php/jirpp/article/view/45
[https://perma.cc/8YMX-EYLS].
33
See Richard. H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform
Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. OF KAN. L. REV.97 (1992).
34
See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
Mario Costeja González (May 13, 2014), http://perma.cc/ED5L-DZRK; Council Regulation
2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (119) 1, https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr/.
35
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).

142

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

agencies. It was intended to protect consumers from the willful and/or
negligent inclusion of inaccurate information in their credit reports.36
The FCRA requires that any “consumer reporting agency” –
which includes organizations that “regularly…assembl[e] or evaluat[e]
consumer credit information . . . for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties”37 – that “fails to comply with any requirement
imposed under [the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to
that consumer…”. 38
However, the FCRA is old. It was enacted in 1970 and was not
designed as a remedy or enabling legislation for modern data breaches.
Plaintiffs looking for federal jurisdiction through the FCRA find it
difficult to shoehorn their claims into the FCRA’s language of
“furnishing consumer reports.”39
As will be discussed below, when looking at Article III standing,
the Third Circuit has considered the violation of the FCRA alone to be
sufficient injury for standing to exist.40
B. State Law Claims
A number of data breach causes of action are found in state law,
including claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, invasion
of privacy and unjust enrichment.41 These claims do not grant federal
jurisdiction, and are limited to the plaintiffs who reside in that state.
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands have legislation requiring private or governmental
entities to disclose security breaches involving PII.42 Not all of these

36
“Liability for negligent violations of the FCRA is created by 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. Liability for
willful violations is created by 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, which also provides for punitive damages
upon a finding of willful noncompliance.” Krajewski v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d
596, 613 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
37
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f); see also 16 CFR Part 681.1.

38
39

15 U.S.C. § 1681n.

See, e.g., Holmes v. Countrywide Financial Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 WL 2873892,
at *15 (D. W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012).
40
See infra VI.C.3.a.
41
See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016); see
also Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012).
42
Security Breach Notification Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept.
29, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
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grant a private right of action to victims,43 but some do,44 and some
courts and executive officers are reading in private rights.45
The difficulty is that, both for companies who process PII and for
their customers, it creates a patchwork of legislation, regulation, and
compliance regimes. Even small companies (and, for that matter,
nonprofits, hospitals, schools, etc.) find themselves doing business
with individuals and entities in more than one state. The cost of
compliance with data protection regulations continues to rise.46
C. International Regimes
A very small number of international data protection regimes
purport to give victims of data breaches a private right of action.47
GDPR Article 82(1) provides, “[a]ny person who has suffered material
or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this
Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the
controller or processor for the damage suffered.”48 And Article 80(2)
provides that “the data subject shall have the right to mandate a notfor-profit body, organisation or association … to lodge the complaint
on his or her behalf.”49 The world continues to struggle with how to
handle data protection.

43

See, e.g., S.B. 318, Act No. 396 (Ala. 2018).
See generally Data Breach Charts, BAKERHOSTETLER 26-27 (July 2018),
https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Data_Bre
ach_Charts.pdf; California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.
45
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (“an
individual need not allege some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her
rights under the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek liquidated
damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”).
46
The “average cost of compliance for the organizations in our current study is $5.47 million, a
43 percent increase from 2011 . . . .” PONEMON INST. LLC, THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE
WITH DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS 4 (Dec. 2017),
https://dynamic.globalscape.com/files/Whitepaper-The-True-Cost-of-Compliance-with-DataProtection-Regulations.pdf.
47
See, e.g., Natasha G. Kohne, Mazen Baddar & Diana E. Schaffner, Bahrain’s Personal Data
Protection Law Now in Force, AKIN GUMP (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/practices/cybersecurity-privacy-and-dataprotection/ag-data-dive/bahrain-s-new-data-protection-law-now-in-force.html; Privacy Bill
2018, s 103 (N.Z.).; The Personal Data Protection Bill (Draft), 2018, s 75 (India),
https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Personal_Data_Protection_Bill,2018.pdf; Civil Code
(promulgated by Ministry of Justice, 2019) FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU, art. 195 (Taiwan),
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0000001.
48
See generally General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), art. 82(1), May 25, 2018,
available at https://gdpr-info.eu/art-82-gdpr/.
49
John Patzakis, Esq. & Craig Carpenter, GDPR Provides a Private Right of Action. Here’s Why
That’s Important, X1 EDISCOVERY L. & TECH BLOG (Feb. 28, 2018, 8:51 AM),
https://blog.x1discovery.com/2018/02/28/gdpr-provides-a-private-right-of-action-heres-whythats-important/.
44
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The above image shows nations of the world who have enacted
some form of data protection legislation with their relative levels of
complexity.50
IV.

THE NATURE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

The idea of being harmed by the disclosure of personal
information depends on an understanding of what is personal
information, which in turn forces us to ask what is private? If the
information is not private, then there should be no harm in its
dissemination, whether lawful or not.
A. PII in the United States
The United States uses the concept of PII. The National Institute
of Standards and Technology (“NIST”)51 provides the following
definition of PII:
PII is any information about an individual … including (1) any
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date
and place of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records;
and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an
individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and
employment information.52
50

Data Protection Laws of the World, DLA PIPER, https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/ (last
visited Oct. 29, 2019).
51
NATI’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., http://www.nist.gov/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
52
ERIKA MCCALLISTER, TIM GRANCE, & KAREN SCARFONE, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) ES-1 (Nat’l Inst. of
Standards and Tech, Apr. 2019) (also known as NIST Special Publication 800-122),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf; Glossary,
COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CTR., https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/personallyidentifiable-information (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).; see also Rules and Policies – Protecting
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Why is this important? Because we recognize that not all
information is equally private. The NIST definition includes a
distinction between linked and linkable information, the difference
being information that is uniquely yours (i.e. can be used to identify
you)53 and information which, when combined with other information,
could be used to identify you.54
That “any other information” prong is problematic, because it
makes the definition of PII fluid. In a post following a 2016 speech in
San Francisco, Jessica Rich, the Director of Bureau of Consumer
Protection from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), mentioned the
topic of linkable information:
We [the FTC] regard data as ‘personally identifiable,’ and thus
warranting privacy protections, when it can be reasonably linked
to a particular person, computer, or device. In many cases,
persistent identifiers such as device identifiers, MAC addresses,
static IP addresses, or cookies meet this test. 55
Note the expansion of PII to include the identification, not only of
a person, but of a computer or device.
The combination of a name with other information, for example,
a name on a list of patients for an abortion clinic, can be PII. However,
bits of information, taken alone, can still be PII if they can later be
combined with other information to identify persons.
It may also be helpful to note that many states have enacted their
own data protection laws with PII-like definitions. Consider the
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018:
“‘Personal information’ means information that identifies, relates
to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably
be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or
household.”56
Under the Act, personal information includes
- names, aliases, postal addresses, unique personal identifiers,
online identifier Internet Protocol address, email address, account

PII – Privacy Act, U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/reference/gsa-privacyprogram/rules-and-policies-protecting-pii-privacy-act (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
53
Examples include an email address, social security number, passport number, driver’s license
number, and credit card number.
54
Examples also include a common last names, date of birth, race, gender, and age.
55
Jessica Rich, Keeping Up with the Online Advertising Industry, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(Apr. 21, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/2016/04/keeping-online-advertising-industry (emphasis in original).
56
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(o)(1),
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375.
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name, social security number, driver’s license number, passport
number, or other similar identifiers.
- records of personal property, products or services purchased,
obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming histories or
tendencies.
- biometric information.
- internet or other electronic network activity information,
including, but not limited to, browsing history, search history, and
information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an Internet Web
site, application, or advertisement.
- geolocation data.
- audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar
information.
- professional, employment-related or education information.
- inferences drawn from any of the information identified in this
subdivision to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the
consumer’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends,
preferences, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities,
and aptitudes.57
B. Personal Information in the EU
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) defines
Personal data as the following:
For the purposes of this Regulation:
(1) 'personal data' means any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject');
an identifiable natural person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identifier such as a name, an
identification number, location data, an online identifier
or to one or more factors specific to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person.58
Recital 30 expands on this. “Natural persons may be associated
with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and
protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or
other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. This may
leave traces which, in particular when combined with unique identifiers

57

Id. at § 1798.140(o)(1)(A)-(K).
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (119) 1, http://www.privacyregulation.eu/en/article-4-definitions-GDPR.htm.
58
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and other information received by the servers, may be used to create
profiles of the natural persons and identify them.”59
The GDPR took effect in May of 2018, and there are many
questions yet unanswered about its scope and effect. However, at least
initially, we can note that the GDPR’s definition is broader, in that it
attempts to include direct or indirect identification and does not require
the information to identify the person, but that the person could be
“identifiable.”
C. Personal Information in China
China’s Personal Information Security Specification took effect
in May 2018. The Specification is the “effective centerpiece of an
emerging system around personal data,” which includes the 2017
Cybersecurity Law.60 The CSL loosely defines both personal data and
a new category of personal sensitive data, which may include “data that
may lead to bodily harm, property damage, reputational harm, harm to
personal heath, or discriminative treatment of an individual if such data
is disclosed, leaked or abused.”61
V.

DAMAGES
A. The Case or Controversy Clause and Cyber Theft

When no financial harm has been experienced yet by the victims
of cyber theft of data, the circuit courts are split as to whether a case or
controversy exists.
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
59

Council Regulation 2016/679, Recital 30, 2016 O.K. (119) 1, http://www.privacyregulation.eu/en/r30.htm.
60
Mingli Shi, Samm Sacks, Qiheng Chen, & Graham Webster, Translation: China’s Personal
Information Security Specification, NEW AMERICA (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinas-personalinformation-security-specification/.
61
Id.
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between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.62
“[S]etting apart the ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are of the
justiciable sort referred to in Article III—'serv[ing] to identify those
disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
process,’—is the doctrine of standing.”63
The Supreme Court has established three elements of Article III
standing:
1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized;
2) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury; and
3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressable by the
court.64
In breach cases, Article III standing usually comes into play with
respect to elements 1 and 2.
With respect to the “concreteness” element, defendants have
argued that although they admit a breach, plaintiffs were not harmed.
This happens because at the time of the litigation, very few plaintiffs
may be able to show financial injury. There may be personal
information exposed, but how many fraudulent credit transactions or
identity theft cases follow? And, at least in a few of the cases, the bank
or the defendant offers to cover the cost of the fraud, thus the plaintiff
is made whole – at least in one financial sense.
With regard to the causal element, defendants have argued that
plaintiffs have not proven that their action – allowing a breach to occur
or failing to protect customer data – is the cause of the plaintiffs’ injury.
The Supreme Court has recognized that this element can lead to a very
attenuated, speculative chain of events, and has held that no standing
exists in these instances.65
One major difficulty all these cases demonstrate is that the data
thief is not in court. The plaintiff has suffered an injury at the hacker’s
hand, but the data is being held by a third party. While the state of
cyberlaw is changing, plaintiffs and lawmakers struggle with the
question of whether to hold data processors liable, for how much, and
to whom? Besides the public shock at having trust eroded, and the
violation of identity theft, is it appropriate, under Article III, to hold a
business accountable to all the public? Whose records were taken?
Whose records were misused (and is that even a concern)?
62

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
64
Id. at 560-61.
65
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
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At the beginning of the article, we asked about stolen bicycles.
Theft of a tangible item deprives the user of all enjoyment and use.
Does “theft” accurately describe misappropriation of data?
Conversion or trespass is understandable with tangible property,
but does it accurately describe the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant store, hospital, or insurance company? A bailee is
liable if she cannot account for the property entrusted to her care, but
is personal information bailable property? Does the mere violation of
a statute create a cognizable injury for standing purposes?
These are the questions confronting the courts, who have been
facing a growing number of breaches and a growing number of class
action filings. The circuit courts of appeal have split on the issue of
whether, at the pleading stage, Article III standing has been adequately
plead if no financial harm can be shown to exist … yet.
B. Circuit Court Split
1. CareFirst
The Court’s denial of certiorari is clearly good news for the
Plaintiffs, and may signal that the Supreme Court, at least as of
now, is comfortable with the ongoing split among courts of
appeal over the viability of data breach class actions in federal
court. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C Circuits have
permitted data breach class actions to proceed based on a fear
of identity theft, whereas the First, Third and Fourth have not.
(The Third Circuit, however, has allowed a data breach class
action to proceed based on violation of the FCRA’s
confidentiality requirements.) There is a modest trend among
Courts of Appeal that have recently addressed the issue to find
that standing exists in data breach class actions where the breach
was caused by cybercriminals.66
What did the Appeals Court in Attias v. CareFirst think was the
injury?
After discussing cases which analyzed Article III standing based
on risk of future injury, the court made this statement: “Under our
precedent, ‘the proper way to analyze an increased-risk-of-harm claim
is to consider the ultimate alleged harm,’ which in this case would be
identity theft, ‘as the concrete and particularized injury and then to

66
Phillip N. Yannella & Edward J. McAndrew, Supreme Court Denies Cert Petition in Carefirst
v. Attias, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supremecourt-denies-cert-petition-carefirst-v-attias.

150

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

determine whether the increased risk of such harm makes injury to an
individual citizen sufficiently ‘imminent’ for standing purposes.’”67
But what did the court think identify theft was? “Nobody doubts
that identity theft, should it befall one of these plaintiffs, would
constitute a concrete and particularized injury. The remaining question,
then, keeping in mind the light burden of proof the plaintiffs bear at the
pleading stage, is whether the complaint plausibly alleges that the
plaintiffs now face a substantial risk of identity theft as a result of
CareFirst’s alleged negligence in the data breach.”68
The court then went on the analyze the district court’s dismissal
of the complaint “because they [plaintiffs] had ‘not suggested, let alone
demonstrated, how the CareFirst hackers could steal their identities
without access to their social security or credit card numbers….’”69
Here’s a flaw in the argument. Is the harm suffered by the
plaintiffs limited to the potential to have their identities stolen? Or has
the harm already occurred, because PII stored by a trusted source been
exposed to outsiders?
“So we have specific allegations in the complaint that CareFirst
collected and stored “PII/PHI/Sensitive Information,” a category of
information that includes credit card and social security numbers; that
PII, PHI, and sensitive information were stolen in the breach; and that
the data “accessed on Defendants’ servers” place plaintiffs at a high
risk of financial fraud. The complaint thus plausibly alleges that the
CareFirst data breach exposed customers’ social security and credit
card numbers. CareFirst does not seriously dispute that plaintiffs would
face a substantial risk of identity theft if their social security and credit
card numbers were accessed by a network intruder, and, drawing on
“experience and common sense,” we agree.”70
We can see the court struggling with the right answer but
approaching it from the wrong starting point. This is understandable,
if we consider that the only harm is to have someone masquerade as
you and obtain financial gain fraudulently.
But if we return to my stolen bicycle, the harm occurs not when
someone else decides to ride it (although conceptually we could then
put a “lost opportunity cost” dollar figure to that), but when someone

67
Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 981 (2018)
(citing Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 915 (quoting Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 628.
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takes the bike out of my garage. The harm is that I’ve been deprived
of the bike, and not necessarily that someone else is using it.
Does that analogy translate directly to PII? Part of the problem
the Court is struggling with is the nature of digital information. Unlike
the bike, it can be copied multiple times, and the original (if such a
concept exists!) is not diminished by the use of the copies. But is that
the true nature of the injury?
2. Privacy Redux
In 1890, two young Boston attorneys wrote an essay for the
Harvard Law Review entitled, “The Right to Privacy.”71 In it they
argued that the law protects the privacy of individuals against wrongful
intrusion. “We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected,
whatever their exact nature, are not rights arising from contract or from
special trust, but are rights as against the world; and, as above state, the
principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not
the principle of private property [which may be the subject of identity
theft, for example] …. The principle which protects personal writings
and any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right
to privacy ….”72
Looking to theft for protection from a breach focuses on the nature
of PII as property. It may indeed be property in the hands of the thirdparty possessor, but that inquiry focuses on the website or business that
has collected the information of another. For them, theft of property
may be the right legal issue.73 The more relevant inquiry for the
individual whose information is should be: has their privacy been
invaded? Has wrongful intrusion occurred?
Notice that if the answer to those questions is “yes”, then we have
satisfied the injury in fact question rather neatly. We do not need to
entertain the question raised by many courts of whether the injury is
speculative or lies in the future, for an injury to privacy occurs upon
the instant when there is intrusion upon another’s privacy.

71

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 193.
Id.
73
But see Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiffs
also claim that they have a property right to their personally identifiable data, and that the theft of
their data supports standing just as well as the theft of one's car would. But the only authority to
which they direct us is Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618 (7th Cir.2014),
which says nothing of the kind.”).
72
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3. Courts That Found Standing
a. Third Circuit
In In re: Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach
Litigation, the court recognized that “In the context of a motion to
dismiss, we have held that the [i]njury-in-fact element is not Mount
Everest. The contours of the injury-in-fact requirement, while not
precisely defined, are very generous, requiring only that claimant
allege[ ] some specific, identifiable trifle of injury.”74
In fact, the Third Circuit seems to be the most generous in terms
of allowing standing.
In November of 2013, two laptop computers containing
unencrypted personal information of more than 839,000 customers
were stolen from Horizon’s headquarters.75 After discovering the theft,
Horizon notified law enforcement immediately, and then alerted
customers by letter and a press release a month later, on December 6,
stating that there were differing amounts of PII that may have been
exposed.76 Some, but not all of the plaintiffs suffered direct financial
harm (including one plaintiff who had a fraudulent tax return filed in
his name).77
The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding “that standing
requires some form of additional, “specific harm,” beyond “mere
violations of statutory and common law rights[.]””78 Although the
court was convinced that at least one of the plaintiffs had suffered a
harm that would meet any of the Article III standards we have
previously discussed, the court proceeded to address the issue of
whether a violation of a statute can give rise to Article III standing
without additional concrete financial harm.79 The court agreed that it
could citing several Supreme Court cases as precedent.80

74

In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014)).
75
Id. at 630.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 634.
79
Id. at 635.
80
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“The actual or threatened injury required by
Art[icle] III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and ellipses omitted)); Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”).

2020]

CYBERDAMAGES

153

Next, the Court looked at its own history of Article III litigation,
and noted that it had not been consistent.81 But the court pointed to two
recent cases, In re Google82 and In re Nickelodeon,83 for the
propositions that:
- so long as an injury “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way,” the plaintiff need not “suffer any particular
type of harm to have standing.”84
- “the actual or threatened injury required by Art[icle] III may
exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing,” even absent evidence of
actual monetary loss;85 and
- “when it comes to laws that protect privacy, a focus on
economic loss is misplaced” and “the unlawful disclosure of
legally protected information” is “a clear de facto injury.”86
The court then turned to Spokeo.87 “Although it is possible to read
the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo as creating a requirement that
a plaintiff show a statutory violation has caused a “material risk of
harm” before he can bring suit,”88 the court noted that the Supreme
Court “rejected the argument that an injury must be “tangible” in order
to be “concrete.””89 Instead, Spokeo teaches that Congress “has the
power to define injuries,”90 including intangible injuries that give rise
to Article III standing. However, “there are some circumstances where
the mere technical violation of a procedural requirement of a statute
cannot, in and of itself, constitute an injury in fact.”91
Judge Schwartz, concurring, decided that the theft of the laptop
showed invasion of privacy, and therefore, no additional analysis was
needed to show a concrete injury.92
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In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 635.
In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015).
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In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016).
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In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d at 134.
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Id.
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In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 272-274.
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Spokeo, Inc., 136 S.Ct. at 1540.
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Noting that the Eighth Circuit had read the case in just that way. In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 637.
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Spokeo, Inc., 136 S.Ct. at 1549.
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b. Sixth Circuit
In Galaria v. Nationwide,93 plaintiffs brought putative class
actions after hackers breached the computer network of Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company. Plaintiffs alleged invasion of privacy,
negligence, and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).94
The district court dismissed the complaints, concluding that plaintiffs
had failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy, lacked Article III
standing to bring the negligence claims, and lacked statutory standing
to bring the FCRA claims.95
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs
had Article III standing and that the district court erred in dismissing
the FCRA claims. With respect to Article III standing, the Court
proceeded with the Spokeo96 three element test for standing: (1) There
must be an injury, (2) it must be fairly traceable to the conduct being
challenged, and (3) the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable
decision.97
With respect to the first prong, the court explained that an injury
must be actual or imminent, and then decided to follow the other courts
that have dealt with this issue by assuming that data theft occurs in two
phases --- the lifting of the data, and then the misuse of the data.98 I
will explain later why this is an incorrect way of looking at data breach
damages, but here the Court reaches the right result. “Here, Plaintiffs’
allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably
incurred mitigation costs, are sufficient to establish a cognizable
Article III injury at the pleading stage of the litigation.”99 In fact, the
court almost gets it right.
There is no need for speculation where Plaintiffs allege that
their data has already been stolen and is now in the hands of illintentioned criminals….Thus, although it might not be ‘literally
certain’ that Plaintiffs’ data will be misused, there is a
sufficiently substantial risk of harm that incurring mitigation
costs is reasonable. Where Plaintiffs already know that they
have lost control of their data, it would be unreasonable to
expect Plaintiffs to wait for actual misuse—a fraudulent charge
on a credit card, for example—before taking steps to ensure
93

Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x 384, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
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Id. at 387.
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Injury is “the ‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s three elements.” Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388
(citing Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1547).
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Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
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their own personal and financial security, particularly when
Nationwide recommended taking these steps.100
As we can see, the Court was more persuaded that plaintiffs’
mitigation costs, coupled with Nationwide’s offer of credit monitoring,
was enough to show injury. Left for another day was the issue of
whether the theft itself was injury enough.
The majority had no issues with the other two prongs of the test,
but the dissent was bothered that the second factor of traceability was
not met.
The complaints simply allege that hackers were in fact able to
access the plaintiffs’ personal information. From that fact, the
complaints conclude that Nationwide failed to protect that
information. But plaintiffs make no factual allegations
regarding how the hackers were able to breach Nationwide’s
system, nor do they indicate what Nationwide might have done
to prevent that breach but failed to do.101
This may have been both a pleading issue and a fundamental
misunderstanding that the plaintiff has some duty to show how a breach
occurred. This is not the case in other areas of the law. For example,
in bailment, “a bailor need prove only (1) the contract of bailment, (2)
delivery of the bailed property to the bailee and (3) failure of the bailee
to redeliver the bailed property undamaged at the termination of the
bailment.”102 It is not the bailor’s duty to plead how the property was
lost or damaged. Why should it be so with data?

c. Seventh Circuit
In 2013, hackers stole approximately 350,000 credit card numbers
of Neiman Marcus customers.103 The company learned of the breach in
mid-December but kept the information confidential at first.104 Neiman
Marcus discovered potential malware in its computer systems on
January 1, 2014 but waited until January 10, 2014 to announce the
breach to the public, at which point several customers sued pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).105 The district
court granted Neiman Marcus’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of standing and for failure to state a claim.106

100
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d. Ninth Circuit
In Zappos,107 more than 24 million customers had their “names,
account numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping
addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card
information”108 taken by hackers. In the resulting class action
litigation, “some of the plaintiffs alleged that the hackers used stolen
information about them to conduct subsequent financial transactions”
while some did not.109 The appeal to the Ninth Circuit was based on the
latter claims and focused on the hacking incident itself (not any
subsequent illegal activity).
This is the second data breach case alleging problems with
standing to appear before the Ninth Circuit. The court considered
whether the prior case, Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,110 was still good
law after the Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA.111 The court concluded that it was,112 and that
Krottner and Clapper were reconcilable. First, the court recognized
that the “injury in Krottner did not require a speculative multi-link
chain of inferences. The Krottner laptop thief had all the information
he needed to open accounts or spend money in the plaintiffs’ names—
actions that Krottner collectively treats as ‘identity theft.’”113 Second,
the type of theft is important. Krottner involved the theft of PII on a
laptop, while Clapper involved surveillance procedures authorized by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.114 Clapper involved
questions of national security and separation of powers,115 which did
not arise in Krottner. Third, the focus in Clapper was on the impending
nature of the alleged injury, but the court noted that other cases have
correctly focused on whether there is a “substantial risk” of injury (and
not necessarily just an “impending” risk”.116
Having decided that Krottner would control in the case, the court
noted that this case also involved the theft of credit card numbers
(which were not stolen in Krottner), and that Congress had recognized
that credit card numbers are “sufficiently sensitive to warrant

107

In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom.
Zappos.com, Inc. v. Stevens, 139 S.Ct. 1373 (2019).
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628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010).
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568 U.S. 398 (2013).
112
In re Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1023.
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Id. at 1026.
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Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Clapper, 568 U.S. at 398 (2013).
116
In re Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1026.
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legislation prohibiting merchants from printing such numbers on
receipts.”117
Zappos countered by arguing that even if the information which
was taken was sensitive, finding standing is not appropriate because
too much time had passed (the breach occurred in 2012, and the case
was argued in 2018), and therefore, the alleged harm was
speculative.118 The court noted that argument might be appropriate
later, but not for the motion to dismiss stage.119 “Plaintiffs also
specifically allege that ‘[a] person whose PII has been obtained and
compromised may not see the full extent of identity theft or identity
fraud for years.’”120
e. Eleventh Circuit
In Resnick v. AvMed, Inc.,121 the defendant had two laptops taken
from their corporate office in Gainesville, Florida in December of
2009. The laptops contained customers' sensitive information,
including protected health information, Social Security numbers,
names, addresses, and phone numbers.122 AvMed did not encrypt the
data, and the laptops were sold to a fence, along with PII from
approximately 1.2 million current and former AvMed members.123
The court spent some time going through each of the plaintiffs’
claims, but in the end, did not have a difficult time, since the named
parties had both been victims of identity theft, and had suffered
financial harm. The court (and the dissent) spent more time looking at
the issue of causation.124
4. Courts That Denied Standing
a. First Circuit
In Katz v. Pershing, LLC,125 the plaintiff had a brokerage account
with a company that used the defendant’s software service to “make its
clients' nonpublic personal information, including social security
numbers and taxpayer identification numbers, accessible to certain
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authorized end-users….”126 The court struggled with the concept of
standing. The plaintiff had privacy and identity theft concerns, and had
even purchased identity monitoring services, but had no financial harm
due to actual identity theft.127
The complaint alleged several state law claims, but the court still
found no actual injury.
[T]he plaintiff has not alleged that her nonpublic personal
information actually has been accessed by any unauthorized
person. Her cause of action rests entirely on the hypothesis that
at some point an unauthorized, as-yet unidentified, third party
might access her data and then attempt to purloin her identity.
The conjectural nature of this hypothesis renders the plaintiff's
case readily distinguishable from cases in which confidential
data actually has been accessed through a security breach and
persons involved in that breach have acted on the ill-gotten
information.128
b. Second Circuit
In Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., the plaintiff used her card at
Michaels Stores, and, following a breach of Michaels’ network,
discovered that her card was used twice in locations in Ecuador.129 She
prompted cancelled her card, and her bank took care of the fraudulent
charge attempts.130 The Second Circuit agreed with the district court
that she lacked Article III standing, noting that she did not have any
actual monetary damage with respect to the fraudulent charges, nor
would she in the future, since the card was cancelled and no other PII
was taken.131 The court further remarked that she did not plead how
she was financially harmed by having to spend time dealing with the
fraudulent charges.132
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c. Fourth Circuit
In Beck v. McDonald,133 veterans who received medical treatment
and health care at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Columbia,
South Carolina sued after the theft of a laptop compromised their
personal information. In February of 2013, a laptop went missing from
the Center.134 “The laptop contain[ed] unencrypted personal
information of approximately 7,400 patients, including names, birth
dates, the last four digits of social security numbers, and physical
descriptors (age, race, gender, height, and weight).”135
An internal investigation was conducted and concluded that the
laptop was likely stolen and that the Center failed to follow the policies
for storing patient information.136 The Center notified every affected
patient and offered one year of free credit monitoring. The laptop was
never recovered.137
Notice that the pleading in Beck was limited, listing only the
“threat of current and future substantial harm from identity theft and
other misuse of [Plaintiffs’] Personal Information.”138 The plaintiffs
sought relief under the Privacy Act, the APA, and common law
negligence.139
The district court initially dismissed the negligence claims, and
after extensive discovery, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
because the plaintiffs had “not submitted evidence sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they face a ‘certainly
impending’ risk of identity theft.”140
In addressing the standing issue, the Fourth Circuit struggled with
the issue of actual versus speculative harm, and was swayed by the
“attenuated chain of possibilities” rejected in Clapper.141
[W]e must assume that the thief targeted the stolen items for the
personal information they contained. And in both cases, the
thieves must then select, from thousands of others, the personal
information of the named plaintiffs and attempt successfully to
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use that information to steal their identities. This ‘attenuated
chain’ cannot confer standing.142
The court put a heavy burden on plaintiffs. Recognizing that the
breaches occurred years before, the court noted the “plaintiffs have
uncovered no evidence that the information contained on the stolen
laptop has been accessed or misused or that they have suffered identity
theft, nor, for that matter, that the thief stole the laptop with the intent
to steal their private information”143 and “‘as the breaches fade further
into the past,’ the Plaintiffs’ threatened injuries become more and more
speculative.”144 Telling is the fact that the court included this quote
from the district court in the Zappos breach. “[T]he passage of time
without a single report from Plaintiffs that they in fact suffered the
harm they fear must mean something.”145
The plaintiffs did manage to argue that there is “no need to
speculate”146 because they alleged that their personal information had
been stolen. The court explicitly accepted that to be true, but held “the
mere theft of [the laptop and personal information], without more,
cannot confer Article III standing.”147 The court cited Randolph v. ING
Life Ins. & Annuity Co.,148 persuaded by the argument in that case that
“although plaintiffs clearly alleged their information was stolen by a
burglar, they did ‘not allege that the burglar who stole the laptop did so
in order to access their [i]nformation, or that their [i]nformation ha[d]
actually been accessed since the laptop was stolen.’”149

d. Eighth Circuit
In June and July of 2014, the network that processes credit card
transactions for 1,045 grocery stores was hacked, and names, account
numbers, expiration dates, card verification value (CVV) codes, and
personal identification numbers were exfiltrated.150 Interestingly, the
court stated: “[b]y harvesting the data on the network, the hackers stole
customers’ Card Information.”151
In September of the same year, defendants announced a second
data breach had occurred, with different malicious software onto the
142
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same network.152 Sixteen plaintiffs sued, and the district court
dismissed the complaint without prejudice, finding that “none of the
plaintiffs had alleged an injury-in-fact and thus they did not have
standing.”153
The court considered the injury-in-fact and traceability issues.
However, the court was troubled by the eventual use of the stolen
information, rather than the fact that the information was stolen in the
first place. “Drawing all inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, we are
satisfied that the complaint sufficiently alleges that the hackers stole
plaintiffs’ Card Information. Plaintiffs, however, ask us to go further
and conclude that the complaint has adequately alleged that their Card
Information has been misused.”154
Great weight was placed upon the risk of identity theft and credit
card fraud, and whether it had occurred or would likely occur in the
future. All parties agreed that identity theft would constitute an injuryin-fact. What they seemed to miss is that there are other injuries
involving data theft (e.g. extortion, loss of privacy), besides the fact
that data theft is theft, too. Note this comment from the court, which
seems to miss the mark: “[o]ur task is to determine whether plaintiffs’
allegations plausibly demonstrate that the risk that plaintiffs will suffer
future identity theft is substantial.”155
In trying to pigeonhole a data breach into an identity theft claim,
all parties and the courts miss the fact that data has been
misappropriated, and that misappropriation is a current injury.
VI.

AN INCORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF
CYBERDAMAGES?

We began by discussing the theft of a bicycle, the theft of a flash
drive, and the theft of the information contained on the flash drive. The
first two cases are relatively easy; the third causes us some pause.
When information is wrongfully accessed, is there injury?
That the plaintiffs have suffered a harm in most data breach cases
is not in question. If these cases involved only the hacker and the
plaintiff, and the hacker lifted the information directly from the
plaintiff, we would see very clearly any number of theories for liability,
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including intrusion upon seclusion,156 appropriation of another’s
identity or likeness,157 and, in some cases, theft.158
When the plaintiff’s information is taken from a trusted third
party, courts have struggled to 1) find the injury, especially absent
actual identity theft, although this trend is changing as we become more
familiar with data breaches, and 2) to assign blame for the injury upon
the third party. We see several reasons why.
First, injuries in the data breach cases sometimes involve actual
monetary damage, but many times do not (or the monetary damage is
too attenuated from the breach to be able to meet the causation
requirement). Sometimes the harm of identity theft is mitigated by the
victim or a third party, and the public (and the courts?) think, “Whew!”
We shouldn’t find a lot of solace in this. Legislatures the world
over have looked at these breaches and listened to their constituents.
Business leaders lose sleep over the thought that, in the current political
climate, customers are demanding security and privacy, and when a
breach occurs, they expect compensation, sometimes despite the best
efforts of the business to keep their data safe.159
Second, courts and law makers are trying to understand the nature
of the harm. Is it trespass? Invasion of privacy? Breach of trust?
Conversion? Which legal theory is the correct one, and how does that
help us understand when an injury is redressable, and when it’s not?
Property (if data is property?)160 is copiable, so what is the harm
in another copy? Just change your password! But this does not agree
with our legal history of theft or tort. It doesn’t agree with the public’s
notion of privacy (even when that privacy is crowd-shared and tweeted
for all to see).
Third, courts and companies are struggling with the concept of
damage. If there is an injury, how much is it worth? We’ve rushed
headlong into a digital society, with all its apps and connectivity, but
the law is still trying to decide what the ground rules are. Are we open
with no secrets, or are there still some things that are not for public
viewing? If so, how much are those things worth?
156
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Finally, are we looking at damages from the wrong point of view?
A hacker may steal information for a number of reasons, including 1)
to sell the information, 2) to shut down a computer or network, 3) to
extort the owner of the information, or 4) to use the information herself.
In each case, we see the hacker receiving enrichment wrongfully, while
at the same time we may look at the individual and (legally) see no
injury.
CONCLUSION
“[T]he average lawyer is not merely ignorant of science, he or she
has an affirmative aversion to it.”161
“As a general matter, lawyers and science don't mix.”162
We start with these two statements for both entertainment value
and as a cautionary tale. On the one hand, it’s amusing to think that
the law (and lawyers and courts) has an aversion to technology and
science when we rush into the breach whenever technology doesn’t
work. The speed with which putative class actions are formed seems
to prove that no such enmity exists.
On the other hand, the law (and lawyers and the courts) are
creatures of habit and precedent. We love tying technology, science,
the internet, and anything intangible to theories that we have grown to
love and adore for centuries. When we do so, sometimes we find that
the fit is more “round peg in a square hole” than “hand in glove.”
There are a lot of square holes in breach litigation. Statutes can
be vague or use language that no longer applies. Common law actions
such as bailment or trespass don’t quite fit when there is no land,
chattel, or maybe even property to speak of.
As we face more data breaches each year, courts and legislatures
will have to confront the tough issues of damage and liability, standing
and causation, and injury in a data driven world.
Digital freedom stops where that of users begins... Nowadays,
digital evolution must no longer be a customer trade-off
between privacy and security. Privacy is not to sell, it's a
valuable asset to protect.163
As they confront those issues, courts and legislatures will have to
reconcile our changing notions of what constitutes harm from cyber
theft. Because much of the litigation is one victim suing another, the
161
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real harm tends to be obscured. Instead we ask whether one of the
victims was negligent in protecting the data, and whether the other
victim really had anything stolen. Since the thief is long gone, we tend
to look for justice from the only people who are left.

